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Abstract
This paper examines two related questions: what eﬀects do infectious diseases exert on
growth and development, and are they quantitatively important? We present evidence on the
eﬀect of health and infectious diseases on economic development using Hansen’s (2000) en-
dogenous threshold methodology. Taking into account various proxies for infectious diseases
as potential threshold variables we show that countries are clustered in regimes that obey dif-
ferent growth paths and thus provide direct evidence of threshold eﬀects. Motivated by this
evidence we propose an epidemiological overlapping generations model where the transmission
and incidence of an infectious disease depend upon economic incentives and rational behavior.
The economic cost of the disease comes from its eﬀect on mortality (infected individuals can
die prematurely) and morbidity (lower productivity and/or lower ﬂow of utility from a given
consumption bundle). Our main theoretical ﬁnding is that if infectious diseases are particularly
virulent or debilitating, growth- or development-traps are possible. Numerical results from a
calibrated version of the model show that threshold eﬀects of diseases are quantitatively impor-
tant and in particular, signiﬁcant health interventions are required to propel disease aﬄicted
countries to a high-growth trajectory.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O40, O47
Keywords: Infectious diseases, economic development, multiple growth paths, parameter het-
erogeneity, threshold variables
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Macro Meetings at Iowa State and the 2005 conference on Health, Demographics and Economic Development at
Stanford. We are especially grateful to Peter Lorentzen for extensive suggestions and to Bruce Hansen for making
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In studying Africa’s persistently dismal economic performance, development economists have re-
cently turned to health and infectious diseases for an answer. Citing evidence that 80% of the world-
wide incidence of malaria is concentrated in Africa alone, Gallup and Sachs (2000) for instance,
argue how such disease prevalence may be directly behind the continent’s widespread poverty.
We begin with an exploration of the empirical relationship between infectious diseases and
economic development. Despite the abundance of empirical work on diseases and growth, the aim
of our empirical investigation is twofold.
First, we construct the most comprehensive list of proxies for infectious diseases to date. We
consider well-documented aggregates such as life expectancy and adult mortality rates as well as
more disaggregate measures such as indices for malaria, AIDS and tuberculosis. Our infectious
disease data comes from various sources, notably the World Bank, the World Health Organization
and publicly available ones such as Gallup and Sachs (2000) and McCarthy et al. (2000).
Second, we are speciﬁcally interested in seeing if there are non-linearities in the relationship
between diseases and economic growth. To do so, we use Hansen’s (2000) endogenous thresh-
old methodology to search for multiple regimes. Hansen develops a statistical theory of threshold
estimation in the regression context that allows for cross-section observations. Least squares estima-
tion is considered and an asymptotic distribution theory for the regression estimates is developed.
The main advantage of Hansen’s methodology over, for instance, the Durlauf and Johnson (1995)
regression-tree approach is that the former is based on an asymptotic distribution theory which can
formally test the statistical signiﬁcance of regimes selected by the data. Using our various proxies
for infectious disease as potential threshold variables we show that countries are indeed clustered
in regimes that obey diﬀerent growth paths and thus give direct evidence of multiple equilibria.
We then propose a general equilibrium model of economic epidemiology to explain why health
and diseases may induce non-linearities on the growth process. Epidemiological factors are intro-
duced into a two-period overlapping generations model where the transmission and incidence of an
infectious disease depend upon economic incentives and rational behavior. The economic cost of the
disease comes from its eﬀect on mortality (infected individuals can die prematurely) and morbidity
(lower productivity and/or lower ﬂow of utility from a given consumption bundle). Individuals
born in the ﬁrst period of their lives catch the disease from infected (old) individuals with whomDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 2
they are randomly matched. Their susceptibility to the disease from such encounters depends on
preventive health investment undertaken early in life.
Individuals work in youth and invest in capital (broadly deﬁned to include human and phys-
ical capital). Our aggregate technology is Ak to allow for endogenous growth. The interaction
of rational disease behavior with savings-investment incentives generates an interesting pattern
of development. If infectious diseases are particularly virulent or debilitating, thresholds eﬀects
are possible. Societies susceptible to such diseases, for example the tropics and underdeveloped
regions, may simultaneously experience protracted, and high, incidence of infectious diseases and
low economic growth. Regions where such diseases are not as debilitating, or that are relatively
aﬄuent, emerge from periods of slow growth and declining disease prevalence to take-oﬀ into sus-
tained growth. In certain cases, these societies may temporarily experience contractionary behavior
coupled with rising disease incidence before they start experiencing sustained growth and falling
incidence of infectious diseases.
Finally, we calibrate our model to quantitatively assess the importance and likelihood of multiple
growth regimes. Our results show that such regimes are plausible for reasonable parameter values,
and that, substantial health interventions may be required to control infectious diseases and ensure
that the economy takes oﬀ into sustained growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our dataset and econometric methodology
and presents empirical evidence on the eﬀect of health and diseases on economic growth. In sections
2 and 3 we study a theoretical model of rational disease behavior that attempts to explain the
evidence. Section 5 calibrates the model and presents numerical results on the quantitative eﬀect
of diseases on economic development.
2 Empirical Evidence
We begin by examining the empirical relationship between health, disease-prevalence and economic
outcomes. We are interested speciﬁcally in non-linearities in the growth process. Accordingly
we ask: do health/disease variables endogenously split cross-country data into multiple regimes
obeying distinctly diﬀerent growth paths? To answer this, we use Hansen’s (2000) endogenous
threshold methodology.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 3
Table 1: Unconditional cross-sectional correlations between relevant variables
GROWTH LIFEXP60 MALMORT MALARIA AIDS
GROWTH 1
LIFEXP60 0.0271 1
MALMORT -0.2542 -0.1135 1
MALARIA -0.2054 -0.1309 0.6693 1
AIDS -0.2412 – – – 1
2.1 Data
Our dataset is constructed using data series from the following sources: Penn World Table version
6.1 (PWT 6.1), the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the World Health Organization
(WHO), Barro and Lee (2001) and Gallup et al. (2001). For the typical Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) (MRW) growth regression variables, such as real per capita GDP (y), the share of investment
to GDP (sk), and population growth (n) we have used data from PWT 6.1 and schooling (sh)f r o m
Barro and Lee (2001).1 I na d d i t i o n ,w eh a v eu s e dd i ﬀerent proxies for our health/disease variable
including, life expectancy (UNSD-2001), male mortality incidents2 (UN-2000), malaria3 (Gallup et
al.-2001) and AIDS incidents4 (UNSD-2001).
The sample of countries considered is reduced from 96 countries (the original MRW sample
using PWT 4.0) to 88 (using PWT 6.1). The countries excluded from the MRW sample are
Algeria, Burma, Ecuador, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and W. Germany. PWT 6.1includes
two additional countries, Botswana and Mauritius increasing the sample from 88 to 90 countries.
Unfortunately, the schooling dataset from Barro and Lee (2001) is missing 17 observations. After
subtracting the missing schooling observations our sample goes down to 73 countries. Finally, we
drop one to three additional observations due to the health/disease data availability reducing our
ﬁnal sample further to 70-72 observations (depending on the health/disease proxy used). Summary
statistics of key variables are provided in the data appendix.5
1For schooling we have used the average years of schooling for people over the age of 15. Our estimation results
were robust to considering the alternative measure of average years of schooling for people over the age of 25.
2T h em a l em o r t a l i t yp r o x yr e p r e s e n t st h en u m b er of mortality incidents in 100,000 people.
3The malaria proxy represents the percentage of a country’s area with malaria.
4The AIDS proxy represents the incident rate. More speciﬁcally, it is the number of AIDS incidents per 100,000
people.
5The complete dataset used in this paper accompanied with detailed discussion regarding the data sources is
available by the authors upon request.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 4
Table 1 reports unconditional correlations of our relevant variables for our cross-section of 72
countries. Two points are worth noting here. First notice, that none of our four health/disease
proxies are highly correlated with per capita GDP growth. Second, even though correlations have
the expected sign, their magnitudes are not sizable. The correlation that stands out is the positive
and high correlation between male mortality incidents and malaria.6
2.2 Methodology
In this paper we follow the endogenous threshold methodology of Hansen (2000). Hansen develops
a statistical theory of threshold estimation in the regression context that allows for cross-section
observations. Least squares estimation is considered and an asymptotic distribution theory for
the regression estimates is developed. The main advantage of Hansen’s methodology over, for
instance, the Durlauf and Johnson (1995) regression-tree approach is that the former is based on
an asymptotic distribution theory which can formally test the statistical signiﬁcance of regimes
selected by the data.7
In line with most empirical growth literature, we consider the following MRW growth regression
equation:
lnyi,2000 − lnyi,1960 = a0 + a1 lnyi,1960 + a2 lnsik + a3 lnsih + a4 ln(ni + g + δ)+εi, (1)
where yi is per capita GDP for country i, sk is physical capital investment (investment share to
GDP), sh is human capital investment (schooling), n is population growth, g+δ =0 .05 as in MRW,
and ε is a random error term.
We search for multiple regimes in the data by using four diﬀerent proxies of health/disease vari-
ables, namely initial (1960) life expectancy (LIFEXP60), initial (1960) male mortality incidents
(MALMORT), initial (1966) percentage of a country’s area with malaria (MALARIA)a n da v e r -
age (1979-2000) AIDS incidents (AIDS) as potential threshold variables. Consistent with Durlauf
and Johnson (1995) and Hansen (2000), we have chosen initial values of these proxies to minimize
the potential problem of endogeneity.However, we have made an exception with the AIDS data
and have used average (rather than initial) values to minimize the enormous measurement error
associated with initial periods of the new disease.
6Notice that we do not report the correlations between AIDS (measured as the average from 1979 to 2000) and
LIFEXP60, MALMORT, MALARIA (measured in 1960) as they are meaningless.
7For a detailed discussion of the statistical theory for threshold estimation in linear regressions, see Hansen (2000).DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 5
2.3 Threshold Estimation using Health Variables
Since Hansen’s (2000) statistical theory allows for one threshold for each threshold variable, we
proceed using the heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange Multiplier test for a threshold developed
by Hansen (1996). We start our threshold estimation exercise by considering the two aggregate
measures of health, namely initial life expectancy and male mortality. Subsequently, we test for
our more disaggregated proxies of health, namely malaria and AIDS.
First, we consider LIFEXP60 as a potential threshold variable. It is shown that the threshold
model using LIFEXP60 is signiﬁcant with p-value of 0.075, indicating that there exists a sample
split based on initial life expectancy. The top panel in Figure 1 presents the normalized likelihood
ratio sequence LR∗
n(γ) statistic as a function of the output threshold. The least-squares estimate
γ is the value that minimizes the function LR∗
n(γ)w h i c ho c c u r sa tˆ γ =4 6 .3 .T h ea s y m p t o t i c9 5 %
critical value (7.35) is shown by the dotted line and where it crosses LR∗
n(γ) displays the conﬁdence
set [35.5,51.3]. LIFEXP60 as a threshold variable divides our full sample of 70 countries into a
low-life-expectancy regime (below or equal to 46.3) with 26 countries and a high-life-expectancy
regime (above 46.3) with 44 countries.
Second, we consider MALMORT as a threshold variable. We ﬁnd that this threshold model
is highly signiﬁcant (in fact the most signiﬁcant of all models considered) with p-value of 0.007,
pointing to strong evidence of a split based on male mortality incidents. The second panel in
Figure 1 presents the normalized likelihood ratio statistic as a function of MALMORT.T h e
point estimate for the literacy threshold is ˆ γ = 438 with the 95% conﬁdence interval [406,571].
MALMORT splits our entire sample of 72 countries into a low-male-mortality regime (below or
equal to 438) with 49 countries, and a high-male-mortality regime (above 438) with 23 countries.
Third, we consider MALARIA as a threshold variable. We ﬁnd that this threshold model is
also signiﬁcant with p-value of 0.059, pointing to evidence of an endogenous split based on the
percentage of a country’s area with malaria. The third panel in Figure 1 presents the normalized
likelihood ratio statistic as a function of MALARIA.T h ep o i n te s t i m a t ef o rt h el i t e r a c yt h r e s h o l d
is ˆ γ =0 .98 with the 95% conﬁdence interval [0.98,0.98]. MALMORT splits our sample of 72
countries into two regimes; a low-malaria regime (below or equal to 0.98) with 56 countries, and a
high-malaria regime (above 0.98) with 16 countries.
Finally, AIDS is considered as a threshold variable. The bootstrap test statistic for this variableDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 6
Figure 1: Likelihood ratio statistics as a function of threshold variablesDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 7
Figure 2: Regression trees obtained using threshold estimation
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is quite highly signiﬁcant as well with p-value of 0.019. In particular, ˆ γ =0 .49 with the 95%
conﬁdence interval [0.042,19.12] and the entire sample of 72 countries can be split into two regimes
with 16 countries (below or equal to 0.49) and 56 countries (above 0.49). The bottom panel in
Figure 1 presents the normalized likelihood ratio statistic as a function of AIDS.8
Figure 2 presents regression tree diagrams that illustrate our threshold estimation results ob-
tained under the four threshold variable models. Non-terminal nodes are illustrated by squares
whereas terminal nodes are illustrated by circles. The numbers inside the squares and circles show
the number of countries in each node. The point estimates for each threshold variable are presented
on the rays connecting the nodes. Tables 2-3 present the countries in the four pairs of regimes,
respective to the four threshold models.
These results suggest that there is strong evidence in favor of threshold eﬀects. Our ﬁndings
are quite remarkable because threshold eﬀects emerge regardless of the health/disease proxy used
in our estimation. In other words, our results are robust to health aggregated data (such as the
8In addition to these potential threshold variables, we have also considered two alternative datasets for malaria
(Gallup et al.-2001 and WHO-1982) and female mortality incidents (UNSD). To save space we do not report these
results as they are qualitatively similar to our baseline results. These results are available by the authors upon
request. We have also collected data on Tuberculosis (UNSD). Unfortunately, data for initial periods (i.e. 1960-1970)
existed only for a small subset (38 countries) of our sample which made threshold estimation unworkable.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 8
Table 2: List of countries in subsamples using LifeExp60 and MalMort as threshold variables
Thresh.: LifeExp60 Thresh.: MalMort
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Bangladesh Argentina Mexico Argentina Mexico Bangladesh
Bolivia Australia Netherlands Australia Netherlands Bolivia
Cameroon Austria New Zealand Austria New Zealand Botswana
Central Afr. Belgium Norway Belgium Nicaragua Cameroon
Dominican Rep. Botswana Paraguay Brazil Norway Central Afr.
Ghana Brazil Philippines Canada Pakistan Ghana
Guatemala Canada Portugal Chile Panama Guatemala
Honduras Chile Singapore Colombia Paraguay Indonesia
India Colombia Spain Costa Rica Peru Kenya
Indonesia Costa Rica Sri Lanka Denmark Portugal Malawi
Jordan Denmark Sweden Dominican Rep. Singapore Mali
Kenya El Salvador Switzerland El Salvador Spain Mauritania
Malawi Finland Syria Finland Sri Lanka Mozambique
Mali France Thailand France Sweden Nepal
Mauritania Greece Trinidad Greece Switzerland Niger
Mozambique Ireland Tunisia Honduras Syria Papua
Nepal Israel Turkey Hong Kong Thailand Philippines
Nicaragua Italy United Kingdom India Trinidad Senegal
Pakistan Jamaica United States Ireland Tunisia Sierra Leone
Papua Japan Uruguay Israel Turkey Togo
Peru Korea Venezuela Italy United Kingdom Uganda
Senegal Malaysia Zimbabwe Jamaica United States Zambia
Sierra Leone Japan Uruguay Zimbabwe
Togo Korea Venezuela
Uganda Malaysia
Zambia
(26) (44) (49) (23)
commonly used in the empirical literature, life expectancy and mortality rates) as well as health
disaggregated data (such as the malaria and AIDS). More importantly, these results provide strong
support to the main implication of our theoretical model.
2.4 Subsample Regression Results
Next, we turn our attention to the estimation of equation (1) for the four threshold models and
four pairs of regimes. Table 4 presents estimates for each regime. These estimates provide strong
evidence in favor of parameter heterogeneity and the presence of threshold eﬀects. The heterogene-
ity of the coeﬃcient estimates across regimes is striking, as coeﬃcient estimates vary considerablyDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 9
Table 3: List of countries in subsamples using the four proxies of health variables
Thresh.: Malaria Thresh.: AIDS
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Argentina Mauritania Bangladesh Bangladesh Argentina Mauritania
Australia Mexico Cameroon Bolivia Australia Mexico
Austria Nepal Central Afr. Finland Austria Mozambique
Belgium Netherlands Dominican Rep. Hong Kong Belgium Netherlands
Bolivia New Zealand Ghana India Botswana New Zealand
Brazil Nicaragua Kenya Indonesia Brazil Niger
Canada Niger Korea Japan Cameroon Norway
Chile Norway Malawi Jordan Canada Panama
Colombia Pakistan Mozambique Korea Central Afr. Papua
Costa Rica Panama Paraguay Nicaragua Chile Paraguay
Denmark Papua Senegal Pakistan Colombia Peru
El Salvador Peru Sierra Leone Philippines Costa Rica Portugal
Finland Philippines Togo Sri Lanka Denmark Senegal
France Portugal Uganda Syria Dominican Rep. Sierra Leone
Greece Singapore Zambia Tunisia El Salvador Singapore
Guatemala Spain Zimbabwe Turkey France Spain
Honduras Sri Lanka Ghana Sweden
Hong Kong Sweden Greece Switzerland
India Switzerland Guatemala Thailand
Indonesia Syria Honduras Togo
Ireland Thailand Ireland Trinidad
Israel Trinidad Israel Uganda
Italy Tunisia Italy United Kingdom
Jamaica Turkey Jamaica United States
Japan United Kingdom Kenya Uruguay
Jordan United States Malawi Venezuela
Malaysia Uruguay Malaysia Zambia
Mali Venezuela Mali Zimbabwe
(56) (16) (16) (56)DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 10
in sign and magnitude. Below, we provide a brief summary (not a complete account) of the huge
variation in estimates across the regime pairs in the four models.
Starting with the LIFEXP60 threshold model, notice how the point estimates for lnsik vary
from −0.3098 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in Regime 1, to 0.4037 and signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in Regime 2. There is remarkable variation in the estimates associated with physical capital
investment in the MALMORT threshold model regimes as well. The coeﬃcient estimates vary
from −0.7960 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Regime 1 to 0.2751 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level
in Regime 2.
T u r n i n gt ot h eMALARIA threshold model, it is once again pretty astonishing how diﬀerent
coeﬃcient estimates are between the two regimes with regards to initial output (lnyi,60), investment
(lnsik) and schooling (lnsih). Finally, a look at the coeﬃcient estimates in the two regimes under
the AIDS threshold model, reveals the same trend as in the other three models. In particular,
point estimates for lnsik vary from 1.6768 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Regime 1, to 0.0435 and
insigniﬁcant in Regime 2. Furthermore, point estimates for lnsih vary from 0.2960 and signiﬁcant
at the 10% level in Regime 1, to 0.5598 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in Regime 2.
These regression results reinforce our primary empirical and theoretical result of multiple growth
paths due to health/disease variables.9
2.5 Robustness Analysis
Our threshold estimation results are clearly subject to the endogeneity problem that plagues the
majority of growth regressions. Caner and Hansen (2004) have recently extended Hansen (2000)
by proposing a method of estimating and conducting inference on the thresholds in a model with
endogenous explanatory variables and an exogenous threshold variable. At the same time, Bloom,
Canning, and Sevilla (2003) and others have argued that geographical and institutional variables are
suitable instruments and have made important contributions to the literature using such variables.
Using these two developments we examine the robustness of our results to an alterative methodology
that, at least partly, corrects for the endogeneity problem. Our goal is to discover whether the
thresholds previously found are in any way a product of the assumption of regressor exogeneity.
See the technical appendix for a summary of the Caner-Hansen method.
9More generally, our results are consistent with Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Durlauf, Kourtellos and Minkin
(2001), Liu and Stengos (1999), and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004), among others, who ﬁnd strong nonlinearities
in the growth process.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 11
Table 4: Subsample regressions
Speciﬁcation Extended Solow Model
(PWT 6.1)
LifeExp60 MaleMort
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Unrestricted
Constant 2.9726
(1.8109)
5.9426∗∗∗
(1.7662)
6.2131∗∗∗
(1.7921)
2.9265∗
(1.7852)
lnyi,60 −0.3839
(0.1564)
∗∗ −0.7159
(0.1167)
∗∗∗ −0.7960∗∗∗
(0.0992)
0.2751
(0.1614)
∗
lnsik −0.3098
(0.1264)
∗∗ 0.4037
(0.1552)
∗∗∗ 0.4618
(0.1609)
∗∗∗ −0.0591
(0.2318)
lnsih 0.3467
(0.1366)
∗∗∗ 0.6122
(0.2382)
∗∗∗ 0.7804
(0.2377)
∗∗∗ 0.3739
(0.1350)
∗∗∗
ln(ni + g + δ) −0.4991∗
(0.2348)
−1.2806
(0.4232)
∗∗∗ −1.6331∗∗∗
(0.4128)
−0.3090
(0.2300)
Adj. R2 0.07 0.57 0.64 0.22
Obs. 26 44 49 23
Speciﬁcation Extended Solow Model
(PWT 6.1)
Malaria AIDS
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Regime 1
(Low)
Regime 2
(High)
Unrestricted
Constant 6.3490
(1.0455)
∗∗∗ 0.7566
(2.4850)
10.252∗∗∗
(1.8257)
3.4230∗∗∗
(1.2896)
ln(Y/L)i,60 −0.6174
(0.0763)
∗∗∗ 0.0783
(0.2171)
−0.8344∗∗∗
(0.1265)
−0.3240
(0.1089)
∗∗∗
lnsik 0.5025
(0.1772)
∗∗∗ −0.2408
(0.2096)
1.6768
(0.2122)
∗∗∗ 0.0435
(0.1696)
lnsih 0.5621
(0.1071)
∗∗∗ 0.9239
(0.3047)
∗∗∗ 0.2960
(0.1633)
∗ 0.5598
(0.0878)
∗∗∗
ln(ni + g + δ) −0.8177∗∗∗
(0.3327)
−0.7935
(0.4525)
−0.4902
(0.4243)
−0.6670
(0.2101)
∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.58 0.24 0.83 0.38
Obs. 56 16 16 56
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. White’s heteroskedasticity cor-
rection was used. *** Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level. ** Signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level. * Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 10%
level.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 12
The instrument sets used are borrowed from Johnson and Papageorgiou (2005). In particular
we use a set of ﬁve instruments. Three of our instruments are from Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla
(2003): LAT, the absolute value of the latitude of the approximate center of the country; COAST,
the percentage of land area within 100 km of the coast; LAND, an indicator variable that is
one for landlocked countries and zero otherwise; and, HOM, the percentage of the population
in the largest single group that shares the same ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics.
We add to the these variables two variables constructed from the extensive set of landscape and
climate variables in the Center for International Earth Science Information Network’s (CIESIN)
National Aggregates of Geospatial Data: Population, Landscape and Climate Estimates (PLACE)
dataset. The ﬁrst of these is TEMPER, the percentage of land area with a temperate climate and
the second is BIOME, the percentage of land area in biome classes described as “temperate” or
“Mediterranean.”10
Figure 3 presents the normalized likelihood ratio sequence LR∗
n(γ) statistic as a function of the
threshold variable using the Caner-Hansen methodology. The top panel represents Life Expectancy,
the middle panel Male Mortality and the bottom panel AIDS. It is obvious that these ﬁgures
compare well with those in Figure 1. We could not conﬁrm our results for Malaria as we failed to
obtain convergence in the procedure used. The most likely reason for this is the large number of
zeros and ones that appear in the Malaria data series.11
The main result from this exercise is that the thresholds found in our empirical analysis are not
due to the regressor exogeneity assumption. More precisely, we ﬁnd that exactly the same thresholds
for Life Expectancy, Male Mortality and AIDS continue to exist when we use the Caner-Hansen
methodology.
3M o d e l
Evidence supporting thresholds in cross-country data, as we uncovered in the previous section,
are usually taken to imply non-ergodicity or path dependence. In this section we will propose a
theoretical model motivated by the evidence and show how infectious diseases can adversely aﬀect
economic incentives and lead to poverty traps.
10For more details on the construction of these dataset we refer the interested reader to Johnson and Papageorgiou
(2005).
11More precisely a matrix required for the estimation of coeﬃcient estimates was not positive deﬁnite.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 13
Figure 3: Likelihood ratio statistics as a function of threshold variablesDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 14
Our framework is a discrete time, inﬁnite horizon economy populated by overlapping generations
o ff a m i l i e s . E a c hi n d i v i d u a li sb o r nw i t ha ne ﬃciency labor endowment of (1,0) and potentially
lives for two periods. The modiﬁcation we introduce to the standard model is the possibility of
contacting an infectious disease early in life and premature death from it.
3.1 Infectious Diseases
Infectious diseases inﬂict three types of costs on an individual. First, he is less productive at work,
supplying only 1 − θ units of eﬃciency labor instead of unity. Secondly, there is an utility cost
associated with being infected: he derives a utility ﬂow of δu(c) instead of u(c) from a consumption
bundle c,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1). Thirdly, an infected young individual faces the risk of premature death.
In particular, he may not live through his entire old-age.12
Young individuals undertake preventive health investment, xt, early in life. This may take
the form of net food intake (that is, nutrients available for cellular growth), personal care and
hygiene, accessing clinical facilities and related medical expenditure. It may even take the form
of abstaining from risky behavior, particularly in the context of sexually transmitted infectious
diseases such as AIDS. What is key is that such investment is privately costly and improves an
individual’s resistance to infectious diseases. We model these costs in terms of income, but just
as likely, they can be foregone utility, for instance in sexually transmitted HIV (see Geoﬀard and
Philipson, 1996, for example).
Diseases spread from infected older individuals to susceptible younger ones through a process
of random matching. In particular, a susceptible young person randomly meets µ>1o l d e r
individuals during the course of his youth. Not all of these older individuals will be infected and
not all encounters with infected persons result in transmission. In particular, given his preventive
health investment xt, the probability that a young individual gets infected from such a matching
is π(xt), where π0 < 0a n d−π0(0) > ∞.13
Let pt denote the probability of being infected for a typical member of generation t.I fe n c o u n t e r s
are independent, the probability of not getting infected by the end of youth equals the product
(across meetings) of not being infected. The probability of being infected after one match is
12We may think of an additional cost: infected individuals need to invest in curative health care. This is easily
incorporated but does not add much to our analysis.
13This last assumption is not necessary to obtain multiple growth paths, it only makes the model’s predictions
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the probability of meeting an infected individual (it) times the probability of getting infected in
match (πt), that is, itπ(xt). Hence, the probability of not being infected after µ m a t c h e si ss i m p l y
[1 − itπ(xt)]
µ.T h u s ,
pt =1− [1 − itπ(xt)]
µ .
We outline the timeline of events in Figure 4. Note that preventive health investments are
chosen ex ante, before an individual meets an infected older person. Once a young individual’s
infection status is determined, his consumption and savings choices are determined in the usual
manner.
Figure 4: Timeline of Events
3.2 Preferences
Preferences and individual behavior are disease contingent. We consider ﬁrst decisions of an unin-
fected individual whose health investment has successfully protected him from the disease. The pe-
riod utility function u(c) is increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable with u0 > 0, u00 < 0. In ad-
dition, it is homothetic, current and future consumptions are normal goods, and −cu00(c)/u0(c) < 1.
The individual maximizes lifetime utility
u
³
cU
1t
´
+ βu
³
cU
2t+1
´
, β ∈ (0,1)
subject to the budget constraints
cU
1t = wt − xt − zU
t ,DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 16
cU
2t+1 = Rt+1zU
t .
where w i st h ew a g ep e re ﬃciency unit of labor, z denotes savings and x is given, as per decisions
made early in period t.14 Hereafter we shall tag variables by U and I to denote decisions and
outcomes for uninfected and infected individuals respectively.
An infected individual faces a constant probability φ ∈ (0,1) of dying from the disease in
old-age. Assuming zero utility from death, he maximizes expected lifetime utility
δ
h
u
³
cI
1t
´
+ βφu
³
cI
2t+1
´i
subject to
cI
1t =( 1 − θ)wt − xt − zI
t ,
cI
2t+1 = Rt+1zI
t + τt+1,
where τt+1 denotes lumpsum transfers received from the government. We assume an institutional
setup whereby the government collects and distributes the assets of the prematurely deceased among
surviving infected individuals.15 Clearly transfers per surviving infected individual will be
τt+1 =
µ
1 − φ
φ
¶
Rt+1zI
t (2)
in equilibrium.
For convenience, we assume the parametric utility function, u(c)=c1−σ, σ ∈ (0,1). Optimal
savings for uninfected and infected individuals are easily veriﬁed to be
zU
t = zU(wt;xt,R t+1)=
⎡
⎣ β1/σR
1/σ−1
t+1
1+β1/σR
1/σ−1
t+1
⎤
⎦(wt − xt),
zI
t = zI(wt;xt,R t+1)=
⎡
⎣ (βφ)1/σR
1/σ−1
t+1
1+( βφ)1/σR
1/σ−1
t+1
⎤
⎦[(1 − θ)wt − xt] −
⎡
⎣ 1
1+( βφ)1/σR
1/σ−1
t+1
⎤
⎦ τt+1
Rt+1
.
14Implicitly we are assuming that x is ﬁnanced by borrowings early in youth, at zero interest, and repaid after the
labor market clears.
15Alternatively, we could have assumed perfect annuities market which would give the same qualitative results (see
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Substituting these savings decisions gives us the following two indirect lifetime utility functions
V U(xt;wt)=
∙³
wt − xt − zU
t
´1−σ
+ β
³
Rt+1zU
t
´1−σ¸
V I(xt;wt)=δ
∙³
(1 − θ)wt − xt − zI
t
´1−σ
+ βφ
³
Rt+1zI
t
´1−σ¸
,
contingent on preventive health investment xt.
Newborns choose the optimal level of xt to maximize expected lifetime utility. Recall that it
denotes the fraction of old agents who are infected. Given the random matching process mentioned
above, a young individual’s probability of catching the disease is pt = µπ(xt)it if less than one, and
1 otherwise. Hence, individuals choose xt to maximize expected lifetime utility
µπ(xt)itV I(xt;wt)+[ 1− µπ(xt)it]V U(xt;wt)
at the beginning of period t.T h eﬁrst order condition for this is
−π0(xt)it
³
V U
t − V I
t
´
≥ µπtit
Ã
−
∂V I
t
∂xt
!
+[ 1− µπtit]
Ã
−
∂V U
t
∂xt
!
(3)
for xt ≥ 0. This conditions states that, for individuals to be willing to invest in disease prevention,
the marginal beneﬁt from living longer and experiencing a healthier life has to outweigh the marginal
cost of foregoing current income.
All savings are invested in capital, which are rented out to ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrms, earning
a return equal to the rental rate. We assume that at t = 0, the initial old generation is endowed
with a stock of capital K0. An exogenously speciﬁed fraction i0 of them also suﬀer from infectious
diseases. The depreciation rate on capital is set equal to one without loss of generality.
3.3 Technology
A continuum of ﬁrms operate in perfectly competitive markets to produce the ﬁnal good using
capital and eﬃciency units of labor. To accommodate the possibility of endogenous growth we
posit a ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant-returns technology exhibiting learning-by-doing externalities
F(Ki,L i)=A(Ki)α(kLi)1−α + bLi
where A, b>0a n d¯ k denotes the average capital per eﬀective unit of labor across ﬁrms. Standard
factor pricing relationships under such externalities imply that
wt =( 1 − α)Akt + b ≡ w(kt),DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 18
Rt = αA ≡ R.
4 General Equilibrium Analysis
We begin by substituting equilibrium prices and transfers into the savings functions to obtain
zU
t = sU [w(kt) − x(wt,i t)] ≡ zU(kt,i t)
and
zI
t = sI [(1 − θ)w(kt) − x(wt,i t)] ≡ zI(kt,i t)
where,
sU ≡
"
β1/σR1/σ−1
1+β1/σR1/σ−1
#
,s I ≡
"
φ(βφ)1/σR1/σ−1
1+φ(βφ)1/σR1/σ−1
#
.
Note that zI
t <z U
t , as expected, since φ < 1a n dθ > 0. Substituting these savings functions into
the indirect utility functions, we obtain
V U∗
t =
∙³
1 − sU
´1−σ
+ βR1−σ
³
sU
´1−σ¸
(w(kt) − xt)
1−σ
≡ ζU (w(kt) − xt)
1−σ
and
V I∗
t = φσ
⎡
⎣
Ã
1 − sI
φ +( 1− φ)sI
!1−σ
+ βR1−σ
³
sI
´1−σ
⎤
⎦((1 − θ)w(kt) − xt)
1−σ
≡ ζI ((1 − θ)w(kt) − xt)
1−σ
Next we substitute equilibrium prices and savings functions into the ﬁrst order condition for
the choice health investment. Note that individuals do not take into account equilibrium transfers
(2) when making health investment decisions. Accordingly, (3) becomes
ηIµπtit ((1 − θ)w(kt) − xt)
−σ + ηU [1 − µπtit](w(kt) − xt)
−σ
≤− π0(xt)it
h
V U∗
t − V I∗
t
i
(4)
where
ηU ≡ (1 − σ)
∙³
1 − sU
´1−σ
+ β
³
RsU
´1−σ¸
,
ηI ≡ δφ(1 − σ)
⎡
⎢
⎣
³
1 − sI
´1−σ
+ βφσ
³
RsI
´1−σ
φ +( 1− φ)sI
⎤
⎥
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Two possibilities arise depending on whether or not health investment yields positive returns. If,
at xt = 0, (4) holds as a strict inequality, optimal investment will be xt = 0. The right-hand side
of the expression above constitutes the marginal beneﬁt, in the form of higher net utility, from
lowering one’s chance of catching the infectious disease. On the left, is the marginal utility cost of
that investment, since health investment entails a lower current and, possibly, future consumption.
Optimal health investment is zero as long as the utility cost dominates, that is, returns to health
investment are negative at x = 0. Our assumption, π0(0) > −∞, that is an individual cannot
inﬁnitely lower his disease risk through ﬁnite health investments, ensures that such a possibility
can arise. Intuitively we expect this to occur at levels of low income and high prevalence rates
of the infectious disease; private actions, in these situations, are likely to negligibly improve an
individual’s chance of leading a healthy life. Rewriting (4) above as,
h
ηUµπ(0) + ηI(1 − θ)−σπ(0)U {1 − µπ(0)it}/it
i
/w(kt)
> −π0(0)
n
ζU − (1 − θ)−σζI
o
,
or,
χ(kt,i t) > 0,
we note that ∂χ/∂k>0a n d∂χ/∂i>0, that is, private returns from preventive health investment
are negative at low values of k a n dh i g hv a l u e so fi.
For (kt,i t) combinations such that χ(kt,i t) < 0, optimal investment in health will be positive.
In this case, at an interior optimum, we have
ηIµπtit ((1 − θ)w(kt) − xt)
−σ + ηU [1 − µπtit](w(kt) − xt)
−σ
= −π0(xt)it
h
ζU (w(kt) − xt)
1−σ − ζI ((1 − θ(w(kt) − xt)
1−σ
i
. (5)
Optimal health investment
xt = χ(kt,i t)
satisﬁes ∂χ/∂k>0a n d∂χ/∂i>0.
4.1 Dynamics
With a continuum of young agents of measure one, by the law of large numbers, aggregate savings
at t is simply
St = ptzI
t +( 1− pt)zU
t ,DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 20
and asset market clearing requires that
Kt+1 = St.
To express this in terms of capital per eﬃciency unit of labor, note that eﬃciency labor supply
comprises of the labor of infected and uninfected individuals, that is,
Lt+1 =( 1− θ)pt+1 +( 1− pt+1)=1− θpt+1.
Higher is θ, less productive are infected workers and hence, less is eﬀective labor supply.
Given optimal health investment x(kt,i t), pt = p(kt,i t). Under plausible parametric assump-
tions, we can establish that ∂pt/∂it > 0, that is, even though a higher prevalence rate leads to
higher investment in preventive care (∂xt/∂it > 0), it is not enough to lower an individual’s overall
susceptibility to the disease.
The asset market clearing condition now requires that
kt+1 =
p(kt,i t)zI(kt,i t)+[ 1− p(kt,i t)]zU(kt,i t)
1 − θp(it+1)
, (6)
while equilibrium disease dynamics are governed by
it+1 = p(kt,i t). (7)
Assume π(0) > 1/µ so that, in the absence of any preventive investment, the infection rate rises
over time.
We examine equilibrium dynamics using a phase-portrait of the economy. Consider ﬁrst (k,i)
combinations such that χ(k,i) > 0, that is, xt = 0. Since health investment is zero and µπ(0) > 1,
we now have it+1 = µπ(0)it >i t,s ot h a t∆it > 0 for all it. The entire susceptible population at t
becomes infected (pt+1 = 1), hence the phase line for capital per eﬀective unit of labor is given by
∆kt ≥ 0 ⇔ kt+1 ≥ kt
⇔ sI [(1 − α)Akt + b] ≥ kt
⇔ kt ≤ k∗
1 ≡
b
1 − (1 − α)sIA
,
where (1 − α)A<1/sI by assumption. Given the technology parameters (α,A), this is equivalent
to assuming that mortality from infectious diseases is particularly high (since ∂sI/∂φ > 0).DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 21
When health investment is positive, that is, χ(k,i) ≥ 0, the phase line for capital per eﬀective
worker is
∆kt ≥ 0
⇔ µb π(kt,i t)zI(kt,i t)+[ 1− µb π(kt,i t)]zU(kt,i t) − kt [1 − θµb π(kt,i t)] ≥ 0
where b π(kt,i t) ≡ π(kt,i t)it, while that for the infection rate is
∆it ≥ 0 ⇔ µb π(kt,i t) ≥ it.
Figure 5 illustrates the phase-portrait with the dotted line corresponding to χ(kt,i t)=0b e l o w
which xt = 0. Vector ﬁelds indicate that the unique non-trivial steady-state (k∗
1,1) is a sink. For
capital per eﬀective worker and infection rates lying above χ(kt,i t), the ﬁgure illustrates a single
steady-state at (k∗
2,i ∗
2) which is a saddle-point.
Recall that at t = 0 the economy is endowed with K0 units of capital owned by the initial old
generation as well as with i0, the fraction of that generation infected with diseases. Both k0 and i0
are predetermined variables, in other words. Hence, while (k∗
1,1) is asymptotically stable, (k∗
2,i ∗
2)i s
not. In particular, sequences of (kt,i t) which do not start exactly on the saddle-arm SS,c o n v e r g e
either to (k∗
1,1) or diverge to a sustained growth path along which infectious disease prevalence
vanishes asymptotically.
Two speciﬁc features of equilibrium dynamics merit further discussion. First is the possibility
of non-ergodicity in disease incidence and economic growth. At low levels of development (low
k0) and high disease prevalence (high i0), equilibrium trajectories lead the economy to an inferior
equilibrium of high disease prevalence and zero growth. For more favorable initial conditions,
balanced growth results and infectious diseases disappear in the long-run. Note, however, that
such favorable conditions do not preclude trajectories starting out with zero health investment,
that is, below χ(k,i) = 0. Figure 5 depicts one scenario where the economy evolves along the
trajectory comprising of point B and CD. Starting from B, the economy jumps to a point like
C where disease prevalence is maximal (since individuals do not invest at all in preventive health
care) and savings per worker lower. Thereafter diseases and the capital stock evolve along CD as
diseases gradually decline and growth picks up. Overall, a period of epidemic (sharp increase in
disease prevalence) is followed by gradual but steady economy progress.
Intuitively, the possibility of multiple growth paths depends on the economy’s average propensity
to invest. This propensity is a low sI when everyone is infected and takes on the higher value sUDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 22
Figure 5: Dynamics of Diseases and Capital per workerDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 23
for an uninfected population. Under our parametric restrictions, sU allows for sustained economic
growth but sI does not (in our calibrations later we show why such restrictions are sensible). Hence,
the initial infection rate i0 determines an economy’s willingness to invest in the future. Together
with the initial capital stock per eﬃciency unit of labor, k0, it also determines how aﬀordable
health investments are relative to income levels. For very high rates of infection and low levels of
development, not only do people not invest much in the future, they do not undertake suﬃcient
preventive investments either. This results in stagnation and endemic infectious diseases.
The second feature of the dynamics is the nature of transition to the high balanced growth
path. Figure 5 shows that, for equilibrium trajectories starting with favorable initial conditions,
the growth rate of output is initially low as individuals spend much of their labor incomes on disease
prevention. Rewrite (6) in terms of the growth rate of capital per eﬀective worker
1+γt ≡
kt+1
kt
=
1
1 − θp(it+1)
∙
p(kt,i t)sI
½
(1 − θ)(b +( 1− α)Akt) − x(kt,i t)
kt
¾
+
[1 − p(kt,i t)]sU
½
b +( 1− α)Akt − x(kt,i t)
kt
¾¸
.
It is clear that kt has two eﬀects on γt. First it lowers investment per unit of capital for both
infected and uninfected individuals. At the same time, since it declines with sustained growth in
income, health investments become increasingly less signiﬁcant and this tends to boost the growth
rate via higher savings. Declining infection incidence also shifts capital accumulation toward higher
savings by uninfected workers.
The growth rate can exhibit a variety of interesting patterns. One possibility is threshold eﬀects
in the growth rate itself along equilibrium trajectories that converge to the sustained growth rate
of γ =( 1−α)sUA−1. Here, the economy initially grows relatively slowly since infectious diseases
require a signiﬁcant fraction of labor income to be devoted to preventive care leaving little for
investment opportunities. As the disease prevalence rate drops, savings per worker picks up and
the economy grows rapidly. The initial phase of slow growth and disease declines is followed by
a phase of rapid growth and still declining infection rates; eventually, as the infection rate drops
arbitrarily close to zero, economic growth asymptotes the balanced growth path where capital and
income per worker improve at the sustained rate γ.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 24
Table 5: Benchmark parameter values
β 0.99120 α 0.67 θ 0.15
σ 1 A 23.82 φ 0.5
b 1 µ 2 δ 0.9
5N u m e r i c a l E x p e r i m e n t s
One of the multiple growth regime proposed by our theory is of particular concern since it is
dynamically stable and characterized by zero growth, implying substantial human and economic
costs. In this section, we explore whether these dynamic implications of the theory are robust to the
choice of reasonable parameter values. The numerical exercises also help to assess the importance
of the three types of costs inﬂicted by diseases – higher mortality, lower eﬃciency, and lower
quality-of-life – in driving an economy towards a particular regime.
5.1 Calibration
Table 5 presents the benchmark values assigned to the diﬀerent parameters. The model features
overlapping generations of agents that potentially live for two periods. We follow de la Croix and
Doepke (2003) and assume that one period, or generation, has a length of 30 years. We assign a
value of 0.99120 to the discount factor (β); that is, 0.99 per quarter, which is standard in the real-
business-cycle literature. The elasticity of consumption substitution (σ) is equalized to 1, another
standard value. The production function displays three parameters: the technology parameter A,
the capital elasticity α, and the labor productivity coeﬃcient b.W en o r m a l i z eb to 1, and give α a
value of 0.67. We are then looking at a broad concept of capital that includes physical, human and
organizational capital. The value for A, in turn, is chosen so as to reproduce an annual long-run
growth rate in the sustained growth equilibrium of 2%, approximately the average rate in the U.S..
This implies that A is chosen such that sU(1 − α)A equals 1.0230.
We have no guidance about the technology that gives the probability of being infected in a
match (π) nor the number of matches (µ). Hence, we choose the following simple form for the
probability function, π(xt)=1 /(1 + xt), and assign µ = 2, which satisfy the main properties,
π0 < 0, π0(0) > −∞, π(xt) < 1 for all xt > 0, and µπ(0) > 1.
We have more guidance about the parameters that govern the cost of diseases to individuals.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 25
Dasgupta (1993), for example, ﬁnds that workers (in particular, farm workers in developing coun-
tries) are often incapacitated – too ill to work – for 15 to 20 days each year, and when they are
at work, productivity may be severely constrained by a combination of malnutrition and parasitic
and infectious diseases. His estimates suggest that potential income losses due to illness for poor
nations are of the order of 15%. We then choose θ =0 .15. Estimates by Birchenall (2004) for adult
mortality rates from airbone diseases such as tuberculosis suggest a 50% chance of death. Then,
we pick φ =0 .5. Finally, there are some estimates on how ill health aﬀects utility (or quality of
life). In particular, Viscusi and Evans (1990) estimate that for injuries severe enough to generate a
lost workday with an average duration of one month, the marginal utility of income falls to 0.92 in
a logarithmic utility function model, although it can fall to 0.77 with a more ﬂexible utility, where
good health has a marginal utility of 1. This leads us to assign a value of 0.9 to the parameter δ.
5.2 Results
Figure 6 shows the diﬀerent dynamics under the benchmark parameter values. All lines correspond
to an initial infection rate of 0.3. We observe that the three diﬀerent growth regimes implied by the
theory are possible for reasonable parameters. For initial values of the stock of capital per capita
below 0.3505, capital and output increase for the ﬁrst 2 or 3 generations, but later decline and
converge to a zero-growth steady-state. Over there, output remains constant, all the population
gets infected from the disease, and no investment in prevention is carried out. When the initial
capital per capita is, on the other hand, larger than the above value, the economy moves toward a
balanced growth path characterized by sustained growth. In both scenarios, it takes output about
12 generations to reach its long-run path.
The solid line in Figure 6 corresponds to the unstable long-run equilibrium. This means, in our
case, that for i0 =0 .3 there is only one level of K0 (in particular, K0 =0 .3505) that generates an
adjustment path that converges to that steady state. Over there, the values shown by the output
variable and the infection rates are higher than in the other poverty trap, but the economy does
not enjoys sustained long-run growth. Convergence to this third steady state is faster, it takes only
4 generations.
The second set of results are contained in Figure 7. It presents the eﬀect of changes in the
parameters related to the three types of costs induced by bad health. We consider a decrease in
utility, with a new value of δ of 0.7. We analyze a decline in the probability of surviving if infected,DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 26
Figure 6: The three growth regimes, benchmark parameters
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of changes in three types of costs
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with φ =0 .3. Finally, we also check the eﬀect of rising the eﬃciency loss for an infected adult to
θ =0 .35. The ﬁrst, second, and third rows in Figure 7 present these eﬀects on the unstable poverty
trap, the stable poverty trap, and the sustained growth equilibrium, respectively. Only charts for
output (ﬁrst column) and for investment in prevention (second row) are presented. The evolution of
the infection rate follows the same patterns as in Figure 6, and shows diﬀerences between diﬀerent
cases that are the same as the ones shown by prevention investment. For this reason the charts for
it are omitted.
The ﬁrst row of charts gives information about whether a higher cost of bad health implies a
higher chance of ending in a poverty trap. We see that, compared to the benchmark case, only
a higher probability of dying implies this negative eﬀect. In particular, when φ declines from 0.5
to 0.3, the minimum stock of capital required to jump to perpetual growth rises from 0.3505 to
0.4271. A higher reduction in eﬃciency or in utility have the opposite impact. When θ =0 .35 and
δ =0 .7, it becomes more diﬃcult to fall into a poverty trap and, in particular, to achieve sustained
growth the values of K0 must be above 0.2090 and 0.2127, respectively.
T h es t a b l ep o v e r t yt r a pi sa l s oa ﬀected by changes in the costs of bad health. The second row
in Figure 7 suggests that output levels in the low equilibrium decline when the probability of not
surviving to the infectious illness increases. This is also the case if the loss in eﬃcient-labor units
rises. Regarding this second scenario, notice that even thought the chart shows identical steady
state values of y for the benchmark case and for θ =0 .35, the former corresponds to θ =0 .15
and, therefore, implies larger levels of steady-state output per capita. Only when the utility cost
goes up, the level of output in the stable poverty trap does not decrease. However, agents in this
last case are also worse oﬀ than in the benchmark, because they obtain lower utility for all levels
of consumption. Finally, the last row of charts give the sustained-growth equilibrium path. In all
cases, starting values are i0 =0 .3a n dK0 =0 .5. The LHS chart simply shows that economies
further away from its threshold level of K0 (given in ﬁrst row of charts) grow faster.
An interesting result is that in all scenarios, the steady-state investment in prevention is the
same in the three equilibria. The second column of charts in Figure 7 also suggest that prevention
may be key in explaining the eﬀects. Notice that the scenario that provides the worse outcome, a
higher probability of not surviving, is the only one that produces, on average, a lower investment
in prevention than the benchmark case for the same initial K0. Increases in the other two costs
lead the economy to invest more in prevention, reducing the probability of falling into perpetualDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 29
poverty.
We can ask how costly can it be to get a nation out of a poverty trap induced by a high
prevalence rate of infectious diseases. Suppose that the economy is at the worse steady-state of the
benchmark scenario, that is, i∗ =1a n dK∗ =0 .13076. We ask: How much should the infection rate
be reduced to generate perpetual growth? The answer is that it should be reduced at least to 0.15.
Therefore, it requires a very big drop. The situation might be worse if the dynamic power of the
economy is severely damaged. Let us assume that the initial situation of the economy corresponds
to a value of A =1 7 .8. This represents a potential long-run annual growth rates of only 1%. The
economy would be initially described by i∗ =1a n dK∗ =0 .10015. In this situation, a drop in
the infection rate to 0.03 would be necessary to put the economy in the sustained growth path.
The message from these experiments is that pulling economies out of the twin traps of poverty and
disease may prove to be very costly, substantial reductions in the prevalence rate being necessary.
Figure 8 illustrates the capacity of prevalence rate reduction to take the economy into the
growth path. We assume that the drop in it takes place in generation 6. When A =2 3 .82, the
ﬁrst ﬁve generations are characterized by i∗ =1a n dK∗ =0 .13076. For this case, if the reduction
leads it to a value of 0.25, output starts growing fast at impact, and the economy invests heavily
in prevention. However, the beneﬁt of the initial drop only last around 5 generations. Generation
12’s output is as low as generation 5’s. This describes very well also the case A =1 7 .8, i∗ =1
and K∗ =0 .10015, with i6 =0 .15. Only if the drop is suﬃciently large, for example, i6 =0 .15
and i6 =0 .02 for A =2 3 .82 and A =1 7 .8, respectively, the eﬀect is permanent. In these last
experiments, prevalence rates increase after the drop, but after generations 10 or 11 they fall
toward zero and never grow again. The growth rate of output is negative at impact. This just
reﬂects workers that recover their health and oﬀer more eﬃcient-labor units, but does not represents
a fall in total output. After the initial drop, output shows its largest growth rates that later decline
below their new balanced-growth-path value, and eventually recover.
6C o n c l u s i o n
There are several contributions this paper makes to the burgeoning literature on diseases and de-
velopment. First, our empirical examination of how diseases aﬀect aggregate outcomes is explicitly
tailored to study possible non-linearities in the data. In this we adopt Hansen’s (2000) thresholdDISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 30
Figure 8: Escaping the poverty trap
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estimation technique. Results on infectious diseases, including malaria, suggest that geography
and diseases may quite plausibly play a crucial role in shaping the destiny of many developing na-
tions particularly those in the tropics that have consistently suﬀered from diseases and epidemics
throughout history. Secondly, unlike exisiting works such as Acemoglu et al. (2002), Gallup and
Sachs (2000) and McCarthy et al. (2000), we explicitly model the behavior of infectious diseases
in an otherwise standard endogenous growth model. We show that such an epidemiological model
can exhibit interesting dynamics and can, speciﬁcally, give rise to non-ergodicity in disease and
growth paths. Finally, our numerical results from a calibrated version of the model suggest that
multiple growth regimes are plausible for reasonable parameter values, and that, signiﬁcant health
interventions are required to control infectious diseases and ensure that the economy takes oﬀ into
sustained growth.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 32
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Technical Appendix
Caner and Hansen (2004) is the latest installment in a well developed theory of threshold
estimation for linear models including, Caner (2002) and Hansen (1996, 2000). The particular
contribution of Caner and Hansen (2004) is that their estimator and theory of inference permits
endogenous explanatory variables. They develop a two-stage least squares estimator of the threshold
parameter and a generalized method of moments estimator of the slope parameter. Here we give a
brief, non-technical, outline of their methods.
The structural equation of interest is
yi = θ0
1zi + ei,q i ≤ γ
yi = θ0
2zi + ei,q i > γ,
where, for each i, yi is the dependent variable, zi is an m-vector of explanatory variables, qi is
the threshold variable assumed to be strictly exogenous, γ is the threshold parameter, θ1 and
θ2 are m-vectors of slope parameters that may diﬀer depending on the value of qi,a n dei is a
random disturbance term. The vector of explanatory variables is partitioned into a m1 dimensional
subset, z1i, of exogenous variables uncorrelated with ei,a n dam2 dimensional subset of endogenous
variables, z2i, correlated with ei. The model can also be written as
yi = θ0
1zi1(qi ≤ γ)+θ0
2zi1(qi > γ)+ei,
where 1(qi ≤ γ) is an indicator variable that is one if qi ≤ γ and zero otherwise. In addition, this
structural equation the model requires a suitable set of k ≥ m instrumental variables, xi,t h a t
includes z1i.
The threshold is estimated by ˆ γ, the minimizer, over γ ∈ Γ, of the least squares residual sum of
squares, Sn(γ), from the regression of yi on ˆ zi1(qi ≤ γ)a n dˆ zi1(qi > γ)w h e r eˆ zi is the predicted
value of zi from least squares estimation of the reduced form model zi = g(xi,π)+ui,E (ui|xi)=0
using a sample of n observations. The slope parameters θ1 and θ2 are estimated by application of
GMM to each of the subsamples implied by the estimate ˆ γ. The GMM estimators of θ1 and θ2 are
shown to be consistent and asymtotically normal with covariance matrices that can be consistently
estimated by the usual formulas.
T ot e s tf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fat h r e s h o l d, Caner and Hansen propose testing H0 : θ1 = θ2 using
SupW, the maximizer over γ ∈ Γ of Wn(γ), the Wald statistic for H0 given γ. They give the
asymptotic distribution of SupW and describe a procedure to simulate the distribution so that
p-values can be obtained. Asymptotically valid conﬁdence intervals for γ can be constructed as
ˆ Γ = {γ : LRn(γ) ≤ D} where D is the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the
“likelihood-ratio-like” statistic LRn(γ)=n
Sn(γ)−Sn(ˆ γ)
Sn(ˆ γ) . Caner and Hansen suggest using plots of
LRn(γ)a g a i n s tγ to assess the estimator ˆ γ and its precision. We follow this suggestion but defer
discussion of the interpretation of the plots until later in the paper. To test for the presence of a
threshold, Caner and Hansen propose testing H0 : θ1 = θ2 using SupW, the maximizer over γ ∈ Γ
of Wn(γ), the Wald statistic for H0 given γ. They give the asymptotic distribution of SupW and
describe a procedure to simulate the distribution so that p-values can be obtained.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 35
Data Appendix
Country GDP/L1960 GDP/L2000 Inv. Shr. Sch.15 LE1960 MalMort Malaria AIDS
Angola∗ 3127.01 2889.79 7.39 – 32 567 1.000 3.543
Argentina 8711.30 12790.55 17.57 6.97 64.4 217 0.065 2.665
Australia 12593.15 28479.77 24.68 10.25 70.41 207 0.000 2.872
Austria 8249.95 25820.15 25.98 7.60 68 211 0.000 1.429
B. Faso∗ 953.07 1256.60 8.51 – 33.9 586 1.000 11.231
Bangladesh 1329.38 2174.65 9.99 1.64 39.3 551 1.000 0.001
Belgium 8815.76 25233.67 23.95 8.53 69.7 189 0.000 1.690
Benin∗ 1339.08 1614.03 6.44 – 35.9 561 1.000 5.417
Bolivia 2995.62 3360.68 10.11 5.00 41.9 483 0.144 0.217
Botswana 1257.05 4391.11 16.06 3.52 49 537 – 57.084
Brazil 3032.10 8609.03 20.62 3.56 53.3 295 0.731 7.439
Burundi∗ 671.21 705.24 5.01 – 40.5 568 1.000 27.484
C. Afri. Rep. 2697.12 2230.58 4.64 1.46 37.5 519 1.000 20.396
Cameroon 2107.24 2592.84 6.84 2.52 38 602 1.000 10.862
Canada 12475.10 29408.37 21.86 10.20 70.6 183 0.000 3.064
Chad∗ 1512.28 1197.65 9.58 – 34 554 0.989 12.770
Chile 4798.46 11531.51 15.95 6.26 56.1 238 0.000 1.714
Colombia 3291.72 7028.28 11.51 4.16 55.1 298 0.491 1.526
Congo∗ 619.64 2267.26 22.97 – 40.6 583 1.000 168.6
Costa Rica 4556.99 7382.88 14.16 5.02 60 246 0.117 3.405
Denmark 12576.14 29214.81 23.52 9.13 72 154 0.000 2.467
Dom. Repub. 2213.66 6269.87 12.38 3.78 40.6 342 1.000 4.290
Egypt∗ 1875.87 5001.41 6.99 – 44.9 337 0.692 0.029
El Salvador 4272.25 5655.84 7.01 3.41 48.6 363 0.985 3.269
Ethiopia∗ 678.42 834.83 4.39 – 34.9 475 0.976 –
Finland 8833.28 26137.43 26.51 7.54 68 260 0.000 0.388
France 9012.38 24837.32 24.67 6.51 69.6 207 0.000 4.872
Ghana 1114.30 1743.42 10.05 2.99 44 514 1.000 16.679
Greece 4805.43 16211.37 25.85 6.73 67.9 180 0.000 1.226
Guatemala 3044.46 4686.98 8.08 2.44 44.1 514 0.548 2.223
Honduras 2202.64 2619.72 12.19 3.24 44.5 392 0.562 13.256
Hong Kong 3885.03 28985.27 25.83 7.59 – 301 0.500 0.494
I. Coast∗ 2045.07 2396.20 8.08 – 37.9 594 1.000 –
India 1057.29 3029.63 11.53 3.24 42.6 398 0.262 0.073
Indonesia 1170.83 4309.68 12.21 3.38 39.9 605 0.763 0.016
Ireland 6077.69 29673.53 17.91 7.69 68.9 187 0.000 1.095
Israel 6757.70 19731.21 28.12 8.72 67.8 146 0.001 0.883
Italy 7870.53 23409.35 24.85 5.94 68.5 155 0.000 4.531
Jamaica 3466.06 4398.90 19.10 3.99 62.6 251 0.000 11.113
Japan 5352.21 26607.24 31.09 8.39 66.8 238 0.000 0.095
Jordan 2938.15 4764.41 13.14 4.55 45.7 – 0.011 0.147
Kenya 1057.90 1660.26 11.19 2.91 43.4 547 0.961 24.953
Madagascar∗ 1560.13 1077.37 2.85 – 38.9 413 1.000 0.021
Malawi 543.02 1051.85 13.27 2.50 37.2 522 0.748 40.971
Note: * denotes the countries excluded from the original sample due to schooling data constraints. Our sample is therefore
reduced from 90 possible countries to 73.DISEASES AND DEVELOPMENT 36
Data Appendix (cont.)
Country GDP/L1960 GDP/L1985 Inv. Shr. Sch.15 LE1960 MalMort Malaria AIDS
Malaysia 2732.36 11881.36 20.13 4.94 52.1 438 0.983 1.642
Mali 1254.45 1266.79 7.32 0.53 34.1 589 0.997 3.707
Mauritania 1335.74 1980.26 5.95 4.78 37.5 587 0.992 2.082
Mauritius∗ 4113.44 15986.39 12.34 – 58.1 316 – 0.402
Mexico 5157.89 10517.05 18.30 4.91 55.1 306 0.208 2.927
Morocco∗ 1685.31 4360.63 12.89 – 45.4 370 0.954 0.207
Mozambique 1982.94 1220.98 2.48 0.77 33.7 592 1.000 9.823
N. Zealand 13810.97 21675.12 20.98 10.88 70.7 196 0.000 1.170
Nepan 962.16 1916.18 11.16 1.00 37.6 527 0.869 –
Netherlands 10876.95 26779.49 24.25 7.84 73 142 0.000 1.847
Nicaragua 3783.31 2262.50 10.84 3.29 45.4 431 0.225 0.431
Niger 2054.86 1147.25 6.99 0.59 – 543 0.994 4.239
Nigeria∗ 1336.88 1007.52 7.53 – 38.2 551 1.000 3.148
Norway 9463.86 30064.78 31.90 8.79 73.3 144 0.000 0.907
Pakistan 810.79 2373.30 13.10 2.34 43 420 0.710 0.011
Panama 2972.48 7183.22 20.20 6.33 – 273 0.940 7.794
Papua N. Gui. 2728.78 3911.93 11.80 1.82 37.2 521 0.962 1.527
Paraguay 3148.70 5870.30 10.68 4.94 63.2 219 1.000 0.695
Peru 4118.79 5509.87 20.01 5.45 46.3 404 0.186 2.335
Philippines 2633.35 4290.72 14.66 6.21 51.3 449 0.736 0.042
Portugal 4014.21 17372.31 20.87 3.73 62.3 198 0.000 4.889
Rwanda∗ 1206.77 1169.07 3.36 – 41.5 545 1.000 18.540
S. Africa∗ 2312.31 2177.97 12.35 – 48 525 0.005 2.247
S.Korea 1890.55 17871.16 27.34 7.68 52.6 406 1.000 0.031
Senegal 1338.46 1555.28 7.08 2.09 37.5 570 1.000 2.555
Sierra Leone 2756.36 12319.64 2.78 1.56 31 585 1.000 0.596
Singapore 6205.21 9009.19 41.20 5.64 63.2 309 1.000 1.366
Spain 5374.52 19526.76 24.41 5.48 67.7 167 0.000 8.412
Sri Lanka 1696.02 4135.50 10.26 5.37 58.6 204 0.100 0.047
Sweeden 11425.35 25994.72 22.24 9.37 72.7 146 0.000 1.120
Switzerland 16985.64 28795.71 27.73 9.25 70.7 189 0.000 5.656
Syria 1803.30 5126.30 12.44 3.62 48.4 367 0.384 0.036
Tanzania∗ 493.96 632.15 24.51 – 39.3 606 1.000 26.060
Thailand 1412.79 7888.54 29.44 4.89 54.5 395 0.846 17.047
Togo 1140.31 1121.38 7.07 1.90 38 548 1.000 21.910
Tri. & Tabago 5569.74 12713.71 9.95 6.32 61.8 237 0.000 15.906
Tunisia 2546.42 8021.32 18.25 2.79 47.1 324 0.968 0.442
Turkey 3385.51 8031.86 14.89 3.47 48.1 182 0.254 0.038
U.K. 10947.38 24535.04 18.31 8.33 70.4 198 0.000 1.604
U.S.A. 14527.60 37255.59 18.67 10.66 69.7 219 0.000 14.809
Uganda 729.18 1233.64 2.07 2.11 42 549 0.931 19.119
Uruguay 6823.21 10989.42 11.76 6.37 67 187 0.000 2.831
Venezuela 10188.71 7726.34 16.22 4.69 57.9 276 0.045 2.647
Zaire∗ 1232.06 969.50 4.83 – – 568 1.000 –
Zambia 1557.93 1152.75 18.66 3.80 40.3 607 1.000 39.767
Zimbabwe 1595.46 3191.33 24.75 3.10 49.6 571 1.000 55.472
Note: * denotes the countries excluded from the original sample due to schooling data constraints.